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A TEXTUALIST APPROACH TO TITLE VII:
AGGRIEVED INDIVIDUALS MAY BYPASS
THE EEOC
ElinorA. Swanson*
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article demonstrates that a textualist interpretation of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII")' permits aggrieved
individuals to bypass the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC"). Current judicial doctrine considers a timely-filed EEOC
charge a prerequisite to judicial recourse, serving a purpose equivalent
to a judicial statute of limitations.2
This Article proves that this interpretation of Title VII's
administrative and judicial enforcement provisions is incorrect. Instead,
the plain text of Title VII permits aggrieved individuals to either seek
direct judicial recourse, or to delay civil action in order to first seek
administrative assistance.3
A close, careful examination of Title VII's statutory text is not

* J.D., Lewis & Clark Law School. Many thanks go to Henry Drummonds, Professor of Law
at Lewis & Clark Law School, for his invaluable advice and guidance, and to my husband for his
loving patience and support.
1. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-11, 78 Stat. 241, 253-65,
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012)). The Civil Rights subchapter in the United
States Code regarding Equal Employment Opportunities is still popularly known as Title VII.
"Section 2000e was enacted as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . and remains
popularly known as Title VII." Amin v. Quad/Graphics, Inc., 929 F. Supp. 73, 76 n.2, 79
(N.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that 1991 amendments to Title VII did not apply retroactively).
2. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982) (holding that filing a
timely EEOC charge is a judicial requirement akin to a statute of limitations), rev'd on other
grounds, Indep. Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754 (1989); see also Shikles v.
Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. 426 F.3d 1304, 1317 (10th Cir. 2005) (in considering whether a
different statute also had an administrative exhaustion requirement, the court stated "[i]t is wellestablished that Title VII requires a plaintiff to exhaust his or her administrative remedies before
filing suit").
3. See infra Parts II, III.
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merely an intellectual exercise, although commentators have thus far
avoided that textualist inquiry.4 The Supreme Court consistently
utilizes a textualist interpretive approach to decipher the meaning of
Title VII,5 and academics expect that trend to continue.6
In Part II, this Article shows that the plain text of Title VII does
not require exhaustion of EEOC administrative remedies. The EEOC
enforcement provisions dictate that filing a timely EEOC charge is a
prerequisite to EEOC investigation and conciliation and that the judicial
limitations period is tolled during EEOC enforcement activity. The
judicial enforcement provisions, on the other hand, permit any
aggrieved individual to file a judicial complaint in federal court,
without exception.8
Finally, Title VII's statute of limitations is
borrowed from similar state claims.9
In Part III, this Article demonstrates that a textualist approach to
Title VII requires discarding the judicially-crafted exhaustion
4. Marvin J. Lowenthal, A Gross Misunderstandingof Employment Discrimination,61
DRAKE L. REV. DISCOURSE 35, 43 (2013). Commentators dislike textualism and do not utilize
it to interpret Title VII.

5.

See Wal-mart Stores v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2554-57 (2011) (J. Scalia) (holding

that unstructured and unreviewed manager discretion to make employment decisions was not

systemic disparate treatment discrimination, because under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure a class action must be capable of class-wide resolution because the purported class
has common questions of law or fact); Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968,
1977-78 (2011) (concluding that state licensing laws were not preempted by federal law
prohibiting national origin and alienage discrimination; the Court's opinion was determined by
the section joined by Justice Thomas); Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167,
174-78 (2009) (determining that "but-for" causation is required in age discrimination cases
because there is no statutory corollary to the "motivating factor" provision in Title VII); Desert
Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 97-100 (2003) (a plaintiff may "demonstrate" discrimination
under Title VII with either direct or circumstantial evidence); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.,
534 U.S. 506, 512-14 (2002) (the prima facie elements of a Title VII employment
discrimination claim constitute an evidentiary standard, not a pleading burden); Nat'l R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 109-11, 115-18 (2002) (evaluating when an alleged
Title VII unlawful employment practice "occurs," the Court determined that a discrete
discriminatory act happens on the day it occurs but a hostile work environment is a single
employment practice that is continuing in nature and that does not occur on any particular
day); Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 848-51 (2001) (front pay was
not an element of compensatory damages within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
and, therefore, was not subject to the Act's statutory cap).
6. Lowenthal, supra note 4, at 43. (The textualist interpretive approach "is how these
[employment discrimination] statutes are interpreted, and that will not change[.]"); James'
Steinmann, Nothing Inevitable About Discriminatory Hiring: Lewis v. City of Chicago and a

Return to the Text of Title VII, 44 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1307, 1318 (2011) ("[T]he Court's
textualist interpretation of Title VII" is cemented.).
7. Civil Rights Act § 706, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (e)(1) (2012).
8. § 2000e-5(f)(3).
9. § 2000e-5(c).
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requirement. The plain meaning of the statutory text is unambiguous.
Non-textual indications of textual meaning, including the statutory
scheme and legislative history, support that conclusion.10 Stare decisis
plays a minimal doctrinal role under the textualist approach," but even
if that were not the case, this Article shows that there is ample reason to
overrule judicial precedent.
In Part IV, this Article recommends that courts permit aggrieved
individuals to seek judicial recourse without first filing an EEOC charge.
Though textualism is popularly understood to be a conservative
interpretive approach unlikely to favor victims of employment
discrimination, Supreme Court precedent contradicts that assumption.12
Even interpreting the text in light of non-textual context, however, this
Article shows that courts should permit aggrieved individuals to bypass
the EEOC.
II. THE PLAIN TEXT OF TITLE VII DOES NOT REQUIRE AGGRIEVED
INDIVIDUALS TO EXHAUST ADMINISTSRATIVE REMEDIES

A textualist statutory interpretation of Title VII must begin with the
text.
A. The EEOC Enforcement Provisionsare Silent RegardingDirect
JudicialRecourse
The relevant Title VII text,1 4 with notations, is as follows:
§ 2000e-5. Enforcement provisions
(a) Power of Commission to prevent unlawful employment practices
The Commission is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to
prevent any person from engaging in any unlawful
employment
practice as set forth in section 2000e-2 or 2000e-3 of this title.
10. See infra Part III.B.
I1. Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and DemonstrablyErroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REv. 1,
50-51 (2001).
12. See Steinmann supra note 6, at 1319 (the "oft-labeled 'conservative' textualist approach
actually led to the less-conservative result [in Title VII claims] by appropriatrly protecting the
looser standard on limitation-periods.").
13. See infra Part III.A.
14. For purposes of brevity, a summary of the pertinent text is sometimes provided
where the exact language is irrelevant to this Article's analysis.
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The plain text of § 2000e-5(a) describes EEOC enforcement
authority and is silent regarding judicial enforcement authority.'5 The
EEOC's enforcement authority is described as the power "to prevent"
Title VII violations, and courts are instructed that subsequent provisions
"as hereinafter provided" will further delineate the EEOC's authority. 16
The EEOC's power to "prevent" is the power to "render
impractical or impossible" employment discrimination that is intended,
possible, or likely to occur in the future." The word "prevent" is
temporal, implying that the EEOC might not have authority to redress
the wrongs of the past. The future-tense language reflects the EEOC's
public purpose, i.e., to eradicate employment discrimination on behalf
of the public interest, rather than to remedy the wrongs of the past.
1. A Timely-Filed EEOC Charge is a Prerequisite to EEOC
Enforcement Action
EEOC enforcement activity is triggered if an EEOC charge is
timely-filed either "by" an aggrieved individual, "on behalf of' an
aggrieved individual, or by a member of the EEOC." EEOC
enforcement activity cannot be triggered, however, without such a
timely-filed EEOC charge. 20

15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (2012).
16. Id.
17. Fowler v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2045, 2051 (2011) (The word "prevent" means "to
render . . . impractical or impossible" an action which (1) was intended, (2) was possible, or (3) was
likely to have otherwise occured); BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1352 (4th ed. 1968) ("To hinder,
frustrate, prohibit, impede, or preclude; to obstruct; to intercept. . . . To stop or intercept the
approach, access, or performance of a thing.").

18.

Harris v. Amoco Prod. Co., 768 F.2d 669, 675, 682 (5th Cir. 1985) ("[T]he EEOC exists

to represent the public interest in equal employment opportunity.").

19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) ("Whenever a charge is filed by or on behalf of a person
claiming to be aggrieved, or by a member of the Commission,... the Commission shall serve a

notice of the charge . . . shall make an investigation thereof.").
20. See Richard K. Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity Under the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 31 BROOK. L. REv. 62, 82 (1965) ("The Commission is not authorized . . . to
conduct an investigation in the absence of a formal charge. This is a serious lack since . .
nondiscrimination agencies can achieve more positive results through broad investigations of
employment patterns and practices than through procedures geared to the resolution of

individual complaints.").
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§ 2000e-5

(c) State or local enforcement proceedings; notification of State or
local authority; time for filing charges with Commission;
commencement of proceedings 21

(d) State or local enforcement proceedings; notification of State or
local authority; time for action on charges by Commission22

(e) Time for filing charges; time for service of notice of charge on
respondent; filing of charge by Commission with State or local
agency; seniority system
(1) A charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred
and eighty days 23 after the alleged unlawful employment practice
occurred and notice of the charge (including the date, place and
circumstances of the alleged unlawful employment practice) shall be
served upon the [employer] .

.

. within ten days . . . [unless] the

person aggrieved has initially instituted proceedings with a State or
local agency with authority to grant or seek relief . . . such charge
shall be filed by or on behalf of the person aggrieved within three
hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice
occurred, or within thirty days after receiving notice that the State
or local agency has terminated the proceedings under the State or
local law, whichever is earlier, and a copy of such charge shall be

21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c). The omitted text of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) provides that
"no [EEOC] charge may be filed . . . by the person aggrieved" while the aggrieved
individual seeks State or local law relief until sixty days have passed since the proceeding
commenced.

22. § 2000e-5(d). Pursuant to the omitted text of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d), if an EEOC
charge is filed by an EEOC member, the EEOC must notify relevant State or local officials
before taking action with respect to the charge, and, upon request, must afford the authority a
reasonable time to take action.

23. § 2000e-5(e). Originally, Title VII here provided that an EEOC charge "shall be filed
within ninety days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred[.]" Civil Rights
Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706(d), 78 Stat. 241, 260 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(e)).
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filed by the Commission with the State or local agency.24
In context, the EEOC charge-filing period is intended to limit the
EEOC's enforcement authority. The original, un-amended version of §

2000e-5(e) prohibited the EEOC from acting on an EEOC charge filed
more than ninety days after a Title VII violation. 2 5 EEOC action was
thereby limited to Title VII violations likely to continue or recur in
the future, either because they occurred recently or were ongoing. The
extremely short EEOC charge-filing period thus paralleled the
preventative nature of the EEOC's enforcement authority.
The ordinary meaning of the word "shall" is construed as an
imperative mandate if it alters an individual's rights or benefits.2 6 The
word "shall" in the EEOC charge-filing period27 of the EEOC
enforcement provisions is a mandatory prerequisite to EEOC action.
EEOC action can be initiated, however, "on behalf of' an aggrieved
individual or by the EEOC, without action by an aggrieved individual.28
Although the EEOC is required to notify an employer if an EEOC
charge has been filed, there is no similar requirement that the EEOC
notify an aggrieved individual that an EEOC charge has been filed.2 9
The aggrieved individual thus need not file an EEOC charge in order to
24. Id. § 2000e-5(e)(1).
25. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706(d), 78 Stat. 241, 260. Title VII
Section 706(d) ("[An EEOC charge] shall be filed within ninety days after the alleged unlawful
employment practice occurred[.]"). The statute as amended now provides that "[an EEOC] charge
under this section shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful
employment practice occurred[.]" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l). The provision also permits the
EEOC to obtain judicial relief on behalf of an aggrieved individual for compensation
discrimination occurring outside the EEOC filing period in limited circumstances. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(e)(3)(A)-(B).
26. In re Stewart, 14 B.R. 959, 960 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981) (quoting Escoe v. Zerbst, 295
U.S. 490 (1935)); Forest Guardians v. Babbitt, 174 F.3d 1178, 1187 (10th Cir. 1999) ("It is a
basic

canon

of statutory

construction that use of the word 'shall'

indicates mandatory

intent.... As used in statutes . . . [shall] is generally imperative or mandatory." (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 17,
at 1541-42 (definition of shall) ("As used in statutes, contracts, or the like, this word is generally
imperative or mandatory.... But it may be construed as merely permissive or directory (as
equivalent to 'may,') to carry out the legislative intention .... Also, as against the government, it
is to be construed as 'may,' unless a contrary intention is manifest.").
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).
28. Id.
29. The EEOC is required to notify an aggrieved individual if an EEOC charge has
been dismissed, or if the EEOC has failed to take timely action regarding an EEOC charge.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). The EEOC is not required, however, to notify an aggrieved
individual that an EEOC charge has been filed or that EEOC has commenced investigation or
conciliation. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (e).
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initiate EEOC action and might not even be notified that an EEOC
charge has been filed or that EEOC enforcement activities are
underway.30
An aggrieved individual is not a necessary party to EEOC
investigations, is not involved in any adversarial procedures before the
EEOC, and is not bound by the EEOC's decision.31 The word "shall"
in the EEOC charge-filing period is therefore a permissive directive as
to an aggrieved individual.32 If an aggrieved individual wishes for
EEOC assistance, the individual will need to file a timely EEOC
charge if another party has not yet taken that step. 3 3 An EEOC charge
does not, however, relate to the aggrieved individual's judicial
rights or benefits under the judicial enforcement provisions.3 4
2. The Judicial Statute of Limitations is Tolled During EEOC
Involvement
The pertinent Title VII equal employment opportunity text,3 5 with
notations, is as follows:
§ 2000e-5(f)
(1) If the EEOC is unable to conciliate, the EEOC may bring a civil
action against a private employer.36 If the EEOC receives an EEOC
charge "pursuant to subsection (b)" and dismisses it, or if the EEOC
fails to take timely action, defined as 180 days, or 300 days if
preceded by state administrative action under section § 2000e-5(d),37
30. See § 2000e-5(b).
31. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 799 (1973) (One of the Court's
holdings was that, "in view of the large volume of complaints before the Commission and
the nonadversary character of many of its proceedings, court actions under Title Vll are de
novo proceedings and . . . a Commission 'no reasonable cause' finding does not bar a lawsuit
in the case." (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l).
33. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (e)(1).
34. See infra notes 46-47.
35. For purposes of brevity, a summary is sometimes provided where the complete, exact
language is irrelevant to this Article's topic. Quotation marks indicate direct quotes.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f). The EEOC did not have this authority to bring a civil action
in the 1964 enactment of Title VII. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §
706(e), 78 Stat. 241, 260.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l). Title VII originally tolled the limitations period during
EEOC enforcement without that restriction, leaving both aggrieved individuals and employers
in indefinite limbo for the duration of the EEOC's proceedings. See Pub. L. No. 88-352, §
706(e)-(f), 78 Stat. 241, 260-61. After Title VII was enacted, Congress heard testimony
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the EEOC must notify the aggrieved person, and "a civil action
may be brought" within ninety days of that notice "(A) by the
person claiming to be aggrieved or (B) if such charge was filed by
a member of the Commission, by any person whom the charge alleges
was aggrieved by the alleged unlawful employment practice." The
court may permit the EEOC to intervene if the case is of general
public importance, and upon request may stay proceedings for sixty
days pending termination of s t a t e or local proceedings or further
EEOC efforts to obtain voluntary compliance. (2) If the EEOC
receives an EEOC charge and determines that prompt judicial
action is necessary, the EEOC may seek temporary or preliminary
judicial relief pending final disposition of such charge.)38

Under the plain text, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l), (2) applies only
when EEOC enforcement authority has been properly triggered by an
EEOC charge. That provision does not apply, and thus does not bar
judicial recourse, if EEOC enforcement authority has not been properly
triggered.3 9 If EEOC enforcement authority has been triggered by a

timely-filed EEOC charge, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) permits the
judicial statute of limitations to be tolled during federal and state
administrative enforcement proceedings, for 120 days and 180 days,
respectively, plus an additional ninety days to provide an aggrieved
individual with adequate notice that the tolling period has come to an
end. 4 0 For most aggrieved individuals, the effective statutory tolling
period is more than one year the period is 390 days, including the
ninety-day period following the EEOC's right-to-sue letter,41 or even

showing that the EEOC often took "2 to 3 years before final conciliation procedures," and
thus amended the statute to create an earlier exit from administrative procedures.

H.R. REP.

No.92-238, at 12, 54-55 (1971).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(2).
39. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 392, 394 (1982) ("The provision
specifying the time for filing charges with the EEOC appears as an entirely separate
provision [from the grant of judicial jurisdiction], and it does not speak in jurisdictional
terms or refer in any way to the jurisdiction of the district courts."), rev'd on other grounds,

Indep. Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754 (1989). Zipes held that "filing timely
charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal
court," but is instead a judicial requirement akin to a statute of limitations. Id. at 393.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
41. Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 525-27 (1972) (approving the EEOC's
procedure of referring an EEOC charge to the appropriate state agency before processing the
charge); EEOC v. Commercial Office Prod. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 124 (1988) (effectively
extending the filing period to 300 days for claimants living in states with civil rights agencies,
because a contrary holding "would confuse lay complainants" and "embroil the EEOC in
complicated issues of state law"). Similarly, as a matter of policy father than statutory
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longer if the EEOC does not provide a timely right-to-sue letter.
As a
result of this statutory tolling, an aggrieved individual might bring a civil
action under Title VII regarding employer conduct that occurred many
years earlier.4 3
The statutory tolling mechanism ensures that aggrieved individuals
can obtain EEOC assistance without losing the right to seek judicial
recourse at a later date.44 It also prevents employers from stalling
during EEOC investigations and conciliation efforts in the hope that the
statute of limitations will run on the underlying grievances.45
B. Title VII's JudicialEnforcement ProvisionsExplicitly Permit Direct
JudicialRecourse

The grant of judicial jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(f)(3) signifies the end of the EEOC enforcement provisions 46 and the
The grant of
beginning of the judicial enforcement provisions.47
judicial jurisdiction was originally titled section 706(f), and was
placed beside a side-bar notation: "Courts. Jurisdiction.""

interpretation, laypersons and the judiciary should be able to avoid interpreting complicated
issues of administrative law regarding the timeliness of an EEOC charge. Id.
42. Burgh v. Borough Council of Montrose, 251 F.3d 465, 470 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that
Title VII does not borrow from the statute of limitations, thus the two year state statute of
limitations never began to run and "[n]othing in the statute . .. requires a complainant to request a

right-to-sue letter"). Id. at 470-73.
43. Id. at 471-73 (Pennsylvania's two-year statute of limitations period did not bar an
employee's Title VII claim even though the employee requested an EEOC right-to-sue letter over

three years after state and federal agency charges were filed). In the Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth
Circuits, a laches defense may not be available where a claimant merely delayed in requesting, or
waited for, the EEOC to issue a right-to-sue letter. See Ashely v. Boyle's Famous Corned Beef, Co.
66 F.3d 164, 167-70 (8th Cir. 1995) (rejecting the argument that a Title VII plaintiff should be
barred from pursuing pay discrimination claims because she waited to challenge a pay
disparity for over seven years; reasoning that separation of powers principles dictate that
federal courts may not apply laches to bar a federal statutory claim that is timely-filed
under an express federal statute of limitations); Brown v. Cont'l Can Co., 765 F.2d 810, 815
(9th Cir. 1985) (although a plaintiff waited six years to file civil suit after filing an EEOC
charge, "complainants are not required to terminate the administrative process by requesting a

notice of right-to-sue"); Holsey v. Armour & Co., 743 F.2d 199, 211 (4th Cir. 1984) (an
employer could not use a laches defense against a plaintiff's decision to file an action over four
years after filing an administrative charge, because awaiting completion of administrative process
is not inexcusable delay).

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

See Burgh, 251 F.3d at 473-74.
Id.
See Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(a)-(e), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(a)-(f)(2) (2012).
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)(3)-(g).
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §706(f), 78 Stat. 241, 260. Although such

statutory context "cannot limit the plain meaning of the text," it is of use when it "sheds light on
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1. An Aggrieved Individual is Not Required to Seek EEOC
Assistance Prior to Bringing Civil Suit
The relevant Title VII equal employment opportunity text,4 9 with
notations, is as follows:

§ 2000e-5

(f) (3) Each United States district court . .. shall have jurisdiction

of actions brought under this subchapter. Such an action may be
brought in any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful
employment practice is alleged to have been committed[.]

(g) Injunctions; appropriate affirmative action; equitable relief;
accrual of back pay; reduction of back pay; limitations on judicial
orders
(1) If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in
or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice
charged in the complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from
engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such
affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is
not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without
back pay .

..

or any other equitable relief as the court deems

appropriate. Back pay liability shall not accrue from a date more
than two years prior to the filing of a charge with the Commission.
Interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by
the person or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce

some ambiguous word or phrase." Pa. Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 209-12 (1998)
(considering application of Title II to state prison inmates).
49. For purposes of brevity, a summary of the pertinent text is sometimes provided
where the exact language is irrelevant to this Article's analysis.
50. As originally enacted, this provision granted judicial jurisdiction "of actions brought
under this title." § 706(f), 78 Stat. at 260-61.
51. Title VI1 as originally enacted did not include the language "but is not limited to ... or
any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate." § 706(g), 78 Stat. 241, 261 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2012)).
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the back pay otherwise allowable. 52

According to the plain text, judicial courts have jurisdiction
under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) whenever an action is brought under

Title VII, without exception. "[Congress provided a] deliberately
broad grant of access to federal courts in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3),
which . . . counsel[s] against erecting bars to Title VII claims where
Congress does not clearly seek to limit jurisdiction with a restriction." 3
There is no requirement,

according to the text, that an aggrieved

individual must first seek EEOC assistance by filing an EEOC charge. 54
Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), judicial enforcement authority
exists whenever the court finds that an employer has violated Title VII

as alleged "in the complaint," also without qualification or reference to
an EEOC charge.' This omission is a significant textual indication of
Congressional purpose.56 Congress was capable of drafting language
that explicitly required administrative exhaustion, as demonstrated by
the defeated Thurmond Amendment proposing mandatory exhaustion
of all administrative remedies before commencing private litigation
under Title II.5 As stated by one academic shortly after Title VII was
enacted, "there is no provision [in Title VII] which specifically requires
52. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3)-(g).
53. Adamov v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 726 F.3d 851, 855-56 (6th Cir. 2013) (holding that
exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a jurisdictional requirement for a Title VII
retaliation claim).
54. Id. at 856 ("[After 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), Title VII] says no more about the
exhaustion requirement or any connection between the EEOC process and a limit on courts'
jurisdiction to hear Title VII cases."); see also Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S.
385, 393-94 (1982) (holding that filing a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a
jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court, but is instead a judicial requirement akin to a
statute of limitations), rev'd on other grounds, Indep. Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S.
754 (1989); Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 678 F.2d 992, 1001-02 (11th Cir. 1982)
Nothing in the
("[42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3)] unconditionally confers jurisdiction . . . .
express language . . . [suggests that jurisdiction] is conditioned upon the fulfillment of other
procedural requirements. . . . We cannot conclude that Congress' omission of such qualifying
language was inadvertent. .. . [I]f Congress had wanted to limit . . . [jurisdiction,] it certainly
knew how to do it. . .. Congress [instead] conferred jurisdiction . . . without special reference

to [the EEOC enforcement provisions.]" (citations omitted)).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1).
56. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., Inc., 534 U.S. 438, 452 (2008) ("[Ilt is a general principle
of statutory construction that when Congress includes particular language in one section of a
statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress
acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion[.]" (internal quotation
marks omitted)). "We refrain from concluding here that the differing language in the two
subsections has the same meaning in each. We would not presume to ascribe this difference
to a simple mistake in draftsmanship." Id. at 454.
57. 88 CONG. REC. 13904-05 (1964).
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prior recourse or makes such recourse a jurisdictional prerequisitedevices which have been used elsewhere by Congress to make clear its
intention."
Both an aggrieved individual and an employer accused of
employment discrimination may benefit in a variety of ways from
participating in EEOC enforcement proceedings. 59 Nonetheless, the text
of Title VII permits complainants to directly seek judicial recourse. 60
Aggrieved individuals should not be penalized for choosing to directly
file a civil action, rather than tolling the judicial limitations period in
order to seek EEOC administrative assistance.6 1
Under established judicial doctrine at the time Title VII was
enacted, it was well-settled that Congress intended the federal courts to
be "the chief-though not always the exclusive-tribunals for
enforcement of federal rights."62 When "federally secured rights" were
invaded and a "federal statute provide[d] for a general right to sue for
58.

Note,

Discrimination

in

Employment

and in

Housing:

Private

Enforcement

Provisions of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968, 82 HARv. L. REV. 834, 853, 855
(1969) (after examining the text, legislative history, statutory context, and procedural scheme
of Title VII, the Author concluded that courts should permit direct access to avoid a "purely
formal and useless delay"); see also Note, Employment Opportunity: Class Membership for Title

VII Action Not Restricted to Parties Previously Filing Charges With the EEOC, 1968 DUKE L.J.
1000, 1001 (1968) ("The 'permissive rather than prohibitive' tenor ... casts considerable doubt
on the necessity of prior filing with the EEOC. The statute itself does not explicitly state that
an individual may not sue unless he has filed with the EEOC-a procedural prerequisite
which could have been expressly provided for by Congress.").

59. Id. at 845-46 ("[The EEOC] procedure has several advantages. The respondent may
be able to explain and justify or rectify his action without the public condemnation entailed in
a more formal proceeding. The agency's attempt to conciliate will generally be less disruptive
and less expensive than a court trial or full agency hearing. And, perhaps most important, the
absence of direct coercion by the government may help lessen the antagonism between the
parties and encourage reasonable settlement. . . . Conciliation is a device that may reach the

cause of the problem-the individual prejudice which leads to discrimination-whereas a
court order is likely to reach only the effects of the discrimination. Also, informal agency
action may open doors to the poor and unsophisticated-the groups most commonly subjected
to . . . employment discrimination-which would otherwise remain effectively closed
because of the complexity and expense of formal proceedings. Finally, in the process of
conciliation the type of relief the complainant can achieve is in theory unlimited."); Arthur M.

Brewer, Comment, Title VII: How To Break The Law Without Really Trying, 21 CATH. U. L.
REV. 103, 105 (1971) ("Although the EEOC's enforcement powers are limited, its investigatory
powers are far [-]reaching.").

60.
61.

See Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2012).
The "general policy of the law [is] to find a way to prevent the loss of valuable rights, not

because something was done too late, but rather because it was done too soon."

Pinkard v.

Pullman-Standard, a Div. of Pullman, Inc., 678 F.2d 1211, 1218 (5th Cir. 1982) (quoting Avery v.
Fischer, 360 F.2d 719, 723 (5th Cir. 1966)).
62. McNeese v. Bd. of Educ. for Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. 187, Cahokia, Ill., 373 U.S. 668,
671-72 (1963).
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such invasion," federal courts were expected to "use any available
remedy to make good the wrong done."63 It is therefore unlikely that
Congress intended to require EEOC administrative exhaustion prior to
civil suit, as that would limit judicial remedies. "Unlike so many
Governmental structures in administrative law, EEOC is an
administrative agency without the power of enforcement.... The burden
of enforcement rests on the individual through his suit in Federal
District Court."64
The Supreme Court therefore erred when it
concluded that compliance with the EEOC charge-filing period is a
65
judicial requirement akin to a statute of limitations.
2. Title VII Borrows from State Statutes of Limitations for
Similar State Claims
Current judicial doctrine treats EEOC's administrative deadlines as
judicial statutes of limitations.6 6 Courts therefore do not apply state
statutes of limitations to Title VII claims, because in their view a
federal limitations period is applicable. 67 The judicial enforcement
provisions are silent, however, regarding the judicial statute of
limitations for Title VII civil actions.68
As a general rule, when there is no specifically stated or otherwise
relevant federal statute of limitations for a cause of action, the
controlling limitations period is the most appropriate one provided by
state law. 6 9 From 1830 to the modem era, the Supreme Court has

63.

J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964) (citations omitted) (internal

quotation marks omitted) ("When a federal statute condemns an act as unlawful, the extent
and nature of the legal consequences of the condemnation, though left by the statute to judicial
determination, are nevertheless federal questions, the answers to which are to be derived

from the statute and the federal policy which it has adopted.").
64. Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1005, 1007 (5th Cir. 1969)
(holding that a party who files an EEOC charge is exercising a protected right under Title VII
and thus may not be discharged in retaliation).

65. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982) ("We hold that filing a
timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in
federal court, but a requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver,
estoppel, and equitable tolling."), rev'd on other grounds, Indep. Fed'n of Flight Attendants v.

Zipes, 491 U.S. 754 (1989). The Court came to that conclusion without considering the
possibility that filing a timely EEOC charge might be neither a jurisdictional prerequisite
nor a judicial requirement akin to a statute of limitations.

See generally id.

-

66. Id. at 393.
67. Kirk v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 578 F.2d 814, 819 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding state statutes
of limitations do not apply to private Title VII actions), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1004 (1978).
68. See Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)(3)-(g) (2012).
69. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 180-81 (1976) (referring to the Civil Rights
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consistently made clear "that state statutes of limitations govern the
timeliness of federal causes of action unless Congress has specifically
provided otherwise." 70 "In borrowing a state period of limitation for
application to a federal cause of action, a federal court is relying on the
State's wisdom in setting a limit, and exceptions thereto, on the
prosecution of a closely analogous claim."7 1
Congressional silence regarding the statute of limitations is
common in civil rights legislation.72
In each case, courts have
borrowed the state statutes of limitations for similar state claims.73
Similarly, because Title VII judicial enforcement provisions are silent
regarding the statute of limitations for aggrieved individuals seeking
judicial recourse, the Title VII statute of limitations is borrowed from
state claims.74
III. A TEXTUALIST APPROACH TO TITLE VII REQUIRES ABANDONING
FIFTY YEARS OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT

A. JudicialInterpretationBegins, and Ends, With the Statutory Text
Unsurprisingly, the textualist interpretive approach does not stray
far from the text, if at all. The basic premise of textualism is that
"judges must seek and abide by the public meaning of the enacted text,
understood in context" and "choose the letter of the statutory text
over its spirit."
Textualists "do not start from the premise that [the statutory]

Act of 1866); Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 463, 465 (1947); O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S.
318, 321-22 (1914); Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 397 (1906);
Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 613, 616, 618 (1895) (referring to the Patent Act).
70. UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 703-04 (1966) (citing McCluny v.
Silliman, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 270, 277 (1830)).
71. Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 464 (1975).
72. See Timothy A. Kelley, Note, Labor Law Gap-Filling: FederalCommon Law Ideals
Versus Litigation Realities, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 437, 441 (2011); see, e.g., 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688
(2012); 42 U.S.C. § 1981; 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (illustrating that the statute of
limitations is not mentioned within several federal statutes).
73. Lyons v. Metro. Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 416 F. App'x 483, 491 (6th Cir.
2011) ("The statute of limitations for an action alleging a violation of civil rights under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 is the applicable state limitations period governing personal injury claims.").
74. See UA W, 383 U.S. at 703-05 (illustrating that without a governing federal provision
the court is not obligated to provide a provision and will look to the "appropriate state statute of
limitations").
75. See John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REv. 419, 420
(2005).
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language is imprecise," 7 6 or seek out ambiguity where none exists.n

Once a textualist determines that the text is unambiguous, courts "must
The text, as enacted by
apply the statute according to its terms."7
Congress, trumps even Congressional intent. 79 Thus, in the face of
unambiguous text, legislative history and other non-textual clues are
irrelevant.8 0 "When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this
first canon is also the last: 'judicial inquiry is complete."' 8 1
Nothing outside the four corners of a statute "constitutes 'a Law'
within the meaning of the Bicameralism and Presentment Clause of
Article I, § 7[.]"82 A textualist might therefore refuse to examine nontextual evidence of statutory meaning even when a statute contains
ambiguous text.
76. United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 757 (1997).
77. Elliott M. Davis, Note, The Newer Textualism: Justice Alito's Statutory
Interpretation,30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 983, 998 (2007) ("Justice Scalia would have the
Court 'try to find a preferred reading, based on textual and structural arguments, and only if it
cannot reach a preferred reading should it conclude the text is ambiguous."'); Barnhart v.
Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 461-62 (2002) ("[C]ourts must presume that a legislature says
in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there."); see also Dodd v. United
States, 545 U.S. 353, 357 (2005).
78. Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 380, 387 (2009).
79. Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep't of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 122 (2007) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("The only sure indication of what Congress intended is what Congress enacted; and
even if there is a difference between the two, the rule of law demands that the latter prevail.").
80. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001) ("As the conclusion
we reach today is directed by the text . . . we need not assess the legislative history of the ...
provision."); United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 6 (1997) ("Given [a] straightforward
statutory command, there is no reason to resort to legislative history."); Ratzlaf v. United
States, 510 U.S. 135, 147-48 (1994) ("But we do not resort to legislative history to cloud a
statutory text that is clear.").

81. Barnhart, 534 U.S. at 462 (citing Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54
(1992)). See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438 (1999) ("As in any case of
statutory construction, our analysis begins with 'the language of the statute.' And where the
statutory language provides a clear answer, it ends there as well." (citation omitted)).
82. Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509-10 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I
concur in the opinion of the Court with the exception of its discussion of legislative
history .... For reasons I have expressed elsewhere, I believe that the only language adopted in
a fashion that entitles it to our attention, is the text of the enacted statute. Here, the Court looks
to legislative history even though the remainder of its opinion amply establishes that the ...
Act is unambiguous.... Use of legislative history in this context thus conflicts not just with
my own views but with this Court's repeated statements that when the language of the statute

is plain, legislative history is irrelevant." (citations omitted)). See Davis, supra note 77, at 988-89
("Textualists argue that only the statutory text has passed the constitutional requirements of
bicameralism and presentment, and that judicial reliance on unenacted intentions or purposes

'disrespects the legislative process.' . . . [Thus] the search for intent should be restricted to
what can be discerned from the statutory text.").

83. See Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89, 550 U.S. at 121 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("It is bad
enough for this Court to consider legislative materials beyond the statutory text in aid of
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B. Non-Textual Interpretive Tools Confirm the Conclusion that Title
VII's Text is Dispositive
1. Title VII is Part of a Sweeping Statutory Scheme
The Title VII Equal Employment Opportunity provisions are part
of the Civil Rights subchapter of the United States Code. 84 The Civil
Rights subchapter describes each individual's civil right to equal
treatment in places of public accommodation, public facilities,86 public
education, and employment.
Congress also granted the Attorney
General89 and civil rights government agencies90 strictly limited
authority to seek out and penalize recent or ongoing discrimination, in
light of the public interest in eradicating discrimination. 9 1 The Civil
Rights subchapter therefore has two separate goals: first, to vindicate

resolving ambiguity, but it is truly unreasonable to require such extratextual evidence as a
precondition for enforcing an unambiguous congressional mandate." (alteration in original)

(citing Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 73-74 (2004))).
84. See42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2012).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) ("All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment
of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of
public accommodation . . . without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race,
color, religion, or national origin.").

86. 42 U.S.C. § 2000b-2 ("[T]he right of any person to sue for or obtain relief in any
court against discrimination in any [public] facility .... ).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-8 ("Nothing in this subchapter shall affect adversely the right of
any person to
education.").

88.

sue for

or obtain

relief in

any court against

discrimination in public

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (An employer may not "discriminate against any

individual with respect to . . . compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment");

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) ("If the court finds that the [employer] has intentionally engaged in
or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the
court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and
order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, . . . or any other equitable relief as
the court deems appropriate.").

89. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-5(a) (referring to public accommodations); 42 U.S.C. §
2000b(a) (referring to public facilities); 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6(a) (referring to public education); 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a).
90. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1975a(a), (d) (granting the United States Commission on Civil
Rights investigative and advisory functions); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(g) (granting the EEOC authority
to assist employer's with compliance and to intervene in an unlawful employment civil action); 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a)-(f) (granting the EEOC the authority to respond to an EEOC charge of ongoing
or very recent employment discrimination; to investigate the charge; to attempt conciliation or to
bring a civil action against the employer upon the determination of reasonable cause; and sets up

that the limitations period for possible subsequent civil action is tolled during these EEOC
procedures); 42 U.S.C. § 2000f (granting the United States Commission on Civil Rights authority
to recommend that the Secretary of Commerce conduct voter registration and voting statistics).

91.

See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17.
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private civil rights of aggrieved individuals; and second,, to eradicate
discrimination as a matter of public interest. 9 2
In the past, courts have advocated a broad reading of Title VII,
including the enforcement provisions, in order to provide laypersons
with judicial recourse.93 The rule that "remedial statutes should be
liberally construed" 94 is not one that textualists follow. 9 5 Nonetheless,
the broad purpose of Title VII, set within the even-broader Civil Rights
Act, logically reinforces the conclusion that when Congress outlined
the EEOC's federal enforcement authority, it did not intend to thereby
96
limit private judicial recourse.
2. Title VII Legislative History Indicates that Aggrieved
Individuals May Directly Seek Judicial Recourse
Textualists have often derided legislative history as a source of
interpretive authority, 97 sometimes even if the statutory text is

92.

See Developments in the Law - Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1196 (1971) ("Underlying Title Vll is the public
interest in eliminating employment discrimination . . . [and] the private individual's interest
in securing equal employment opportunity.").

93. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 397 (1982) ("[A] technical
reading [of Title VII's filing provisions] would be 'particularly inappropriate in a statutory
scheme in which laymen, unassisted by trained lawyers, initiate the process."' (quoting Love v.
Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 527 (1972))), rev'd on other grounds, Indep. Fed'n of Flight
Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754 (1989); see also Harris v. Amoco Prod. Co., 768 F.2d 669, 685
(5th Cir. 1985) ("It should go without saying that [T]itle VII merits the most generous of
applications. This has been and remains the tradition of civil rights litigation in the federal
[due to] the disparities
courts-a tradition of solicitude for [aggrieved individuals] . .
between litigants in employment discrimination suits[.]").

94. Clodfelter v. Republic of Sudan, 720 F.3d 199, 211 (4th Cir. 2013) ( quoting
Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 65 (1968)); see also Jefferson Cnty. Pharm. Ass'n v. Abbott
Labs., 460 U.S. 150, 159 (1983) ("Because the Act is remedial, it is to be construed broadly to
effectuate its purposes.").
95. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE

LAW 27-29 (Princeton University Press, 1997) (statement of Scalia, J.) ("[The rule] that 'remedial
statutes' are to be liberally construed" is "artificial," "dice-loading," and "increase[s] the
unpredictability, if not the arbitrariness, ofjudicial decisions."); Holland v. Williams Mountain Coal
Co., 256 F.3d 819, 823 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Furthering, that the source of courts' authority to impose
the rule is questionable, because "[a]ll statutes seek to remedy some problem, so the maxim does

nothing to identify what statutes should be 'liberally construed' (assuming that phrase to have a
discrete meaning)" (citation omitted)), rev d, 496 F.3d 670 (2007).
96. See Harris,768 F.2d at 684-85.
97. See Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 510-11 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("It may
seem that there is no harm in using committee reports and other such sources when they are merely

in accord with the plain meaning of the Act. But this sort of intellectual piling-on has addictive
consequences. To begin with, it accustoms us to believing that what is said by a single person in a
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ambiguous.98 Even to the extent legislative history indicates legislative
intent, legislative intent must take a backseat to legislative text.99 For
some textualists, however, it might be possible for the legislative history
to clarify the meaning of the legislative text."'o
One reason to avoid the legislative history is that it can be
intentionally tainted-members of Congress
may manufacture
legislative history in order to influence textual meaning.o Courts
looking to Title VII's legislative history for interpretive guidance should
proceed with caution, as there is evidence that Title VII's legislative
history was in fact altered in just that manner.1 02 Nonetheless, the
legislative history relating to whether Title VII might include an
administrative exhaustion requirement has no indication of selfconscious manipulation, in part because Title VII's enforcement
provisions were completely overhauled near the end of the legislative

floor debate or by a committee report represents the view of Congress as a whole .... There is no
basis either in law or in reality for this naive belief. Moreover, if legislative history is relevant when
it confirms the plain meaning of the statutory text, it should also be relevant when it contradicts the
plain meaning, thus rendering what is plain ambiguous.. . . [T]he use of legislative history is
illegitimate and ill advised in the interpretation of any statute . . . ."); Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co.,

534 U.S. 438, 461 (2002) ("[A] typical story of [the] legislative battle among interest groups,
Congress, and the President.").

98. See supra Part III.A.
99. Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep't of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 117, 119 (2007) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) ("The only thing we know for certain both Houses of Congress (and the
President, if he signed the legislation) agreed upon is the text.... I do not believe that what
we are sure the Legislature meant to say can trump what it did say. Citizens arrange their

affairs not on the basis of their legislators' unexpressed intent, but on the basis of the law as it
is written and promulgated.").
100. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to be an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th

Cong. 504 (2006) (statement of Alito, J.) ("I think [reference to legislative history] needs to be done
with caution. Just because one member of Congress said something on the floor, obviously that
doesn't necessarily reflect the view of the majority who voted for the legislation."); Davis, supra
note 77, at 984 ("Alito brings a markedly different flavor of textualism to the Court. For him the
text of the statute still reigns supreme, but legislative history can be used to establish the context in
which the statute should be read.").
101. See Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a
Fact-FindingModel ofStatutory Interpretation,76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1323 (1990).
102. See 110 CONG. REC. 6419 (1964) (statement of Sen. Morse) ("Those Senators
[debating the bill] cannot agree on any part of the bill. They cannot agree on definitions. They
cannot agree on meanings. What can we expect the courts to do when they come to consider
legislation about which Senators are in such disagreement?"); Francis J. Vaas, Title VII:
Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 431, 444 (1966) ("Seldom has similar
legislation been debated with greater consciousness of the need for 'legislative history,' or
with greater care in the making thereof, to guide the courts in interpreting and applying the
law.").
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process.1 03 The legislative history thus might shed some contextual
light on the text of those provisions.
Drafting the precursor to Title VII, Congress initially modeled the
administrative enforcement provisions after those of the National Labor
Relations Act ("NLRA"),1 04 providing the EEOC with an enforcement
role similar to that of the National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB")."o On May 26, 1964, however, Senator Dirksen presented a
revised version of Title VII, in the nature of a substitute for the current
enforcement provisions of the bill, 10 6 which was enacted into law less
than one month later.' 07 The Dirksen revision stripped the EEOC of
enforcement authority, removing the EEOC's power to file suits on its
own, and shifting the enforcement burden from the federal, public EEOC
to the private aggrieved individual. 0 8
Title VII's enforcement provisions were thereby dramatically
altered. The "primary responsibility for enforcing Title VII" had shifted
from the EEOC to the aggrieved individual, "through the mechanism of
a private action in federal district court." 09 Dirksen had previously
criticized the House-passed version of Title VII for the excessive
bureaucratic regulatory instruments of administrative power,"1 0 and his
Amendment was likely written "with the objective of allaying the fear
that the EEOC would develop into another expensive octopus like
the NLRB . . . .""' As a result of Dirksen's alterations, "[t]he role of

the EEOC is [now] much narrower under the present scheme of Title

103. See infra notes 104-14 and accompanying text.
104. See National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1985)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2012)).
105. See H.R. REP. No. 914, at 30 (1963); see also Miller v. Int'l Paper Co., 408 F.2d
283, 289 (5th Cir. 1969) ("[T]he charging party would only have had to file his complaint
with the EEOC, which would then investigate, conciliate, and enforce."); Hall v. Werthan Bag
Corp., 251 F. Supp. 184, 186 (M.D. Tenn. 1966) ("[T]he enforcement provisions of Title VII
were patterned after the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act: the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission was to have authority to issue cease-and-desist orders
and to seek enforcement of those orders in the courts, and the emphasis was upon protection
of the public interest and upon obtaining broad compliance with the provisions of the title.").
106. See 110 CONG. REC. 13310 (1964).
107. See id. at 14239, 14511.
108. See id. at 13311.
109. Developments in the Law - Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, supra note 92, at 1196; see Hall, 251 F. Supp. at 186 ("[E]mphasis shifted toward the
vindication of individual rights and the burden of enforcement shifted from the Commission to the
'person aggrieved."').
110. See 110 CONG. REC. 6449-51 (statement of Sen. Dirksen).
111. Vaas, supranote 102, at 450-51.
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VII than... as originally drafted."' 1 2 The enforcement provisions of
Title VII more closely resembled those of the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA")'13 than the NLRA, because the EEOC was no longer a
creature akin to the NLRB. 114
Congressional remarks made prior to Dirksen's far-reaching
revision of Title VII's enforcement provisions could not possibly have
related to an aggrieved individual's right to directly pursue a civil
action. Only under Dirksen's alterations did courts have broad,
independent, and original jurisdiction of Title VII claims, rather than
Prior
merely the discretion to review EEOC decisions."'
Congressperson comments expressing a preference for conciliation to
precede enforcement could only have related to the EEOC's conciliatory
responsibilities before the EEOC exercised its then-considerable
enforcement authority.116
The only debate regarding the possibility that Title VII's
enforcement scheme, newly altered by Dirksen, might require
aggrieved individuals to seek EEOC assistance rather than directly
filing judicial suit occurred, is described, as follows:
Senator Ervin proposed striking out Dirksen's proposed text that
permitted the EEOC to file an EEOC charge, arguing that the EEOC
should not play the dual roles of both prosecutor and judge"' (Senator
Ervin's proposal was later rejected). 18 Shortly thereafter, Senator Ervin

112. Miller v. Int'l Paper Co., 408 F.2d 283, 289-90 (5th Cir. 1969).
113. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-06 (2010).
114. Title VII was the second employment discrimination bill enacted by the 88th Congressthe same Congress that earlier amended the FLSA by enacting the Equal Pay Act ("EPA") of 1963.
See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). Courts have recognized that the EPA "serves the same fundamental
purpose" as Title VIl. Rosen v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 477 F.2d 90, 96 (3d Cir. 1973). As a
result of similarities between the statutes, "cases interpreting Title VII are often helpful and

persuasive in construing the FLSA, and vice versa." Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 810 n.5 (7th
Cir. 1992). Under the EPA and FLSA, aggrieved individuals are permitted, but not required, to seek
the assistance of the Secretary of Labor prior to bringing judicial suit. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Lublin,
McGaughy & Associates, 358 U.S. 207, 214 (1959) (the FLSA does not require administrative
exhaustion); Ososky v. Wick, 704 F.2d 1264, 1265 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("[The EPA does] not include
an exhaustion requirement.").

Further, at the time Title VII was enacted, "the applicable statute of

limitations [for FLSA claims] . . . was the statute of limitations of the particular state where the
cause of action accrued." Carroll v. Pittsburgh Steel Co., 100 F. Supp. 749, 751 (W.D. Pa. 1951).
115. See EEOC v. Liberty Trucking Co., 695 F.2d 1038, 1041 (7th Cir. 1982) ("In place of the
complex jurisdiction provisions of the original proposals, . . . the entire provision for federal court
jurisdiction was simply subsumed in section 706(f)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), which contains
the ambiguous phrase 'actions brought under this title.').
116. See id.
117. See 110 CONG. REC. 1486-87 (1964).
118. Id. at 13698.
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stated that "the bill certainly puts the key to the courthouse door in the
hands of the Commission. This is true because the aggrieved party
cannot sue in the Federal courts unless the Commission first finds that
there is reasonable cause to believe the charge is true. . . ."19 In that
context, Senator Ervin's attention was directed to what might occur
after the EEOC filed an EEOC charge, and was only tangentially
directed to the question of what might occur after an aggrieved
individual filed an EEOC charge or sought direct judicial recourse.
Senator Ervin also seems to have been concerned that the EEOC would
still function as an NLRB-type enforcement entity, given his assumption
that the EEOC would spontaneously initiate EEOC enforcement
proceedings by filing an EEOC charge, act as the "judge," and then
proceed to judicial review. 2 0
Nonetheless, Senator Humphrey responded to that side note,
stating that "[t]he individual may proceed in his own right at any
time. He may take his complaint to the Commission, he may bypass
the Commission, or he may go directly to court."l21 Senator Javits also
responded:
[t]he Commission may find the claim invalid; yet the complainant still
can sue, and so may the Attorney General, if he finds reasonable
cause for doing so. In short, the Commission does not hold the key
The only thing this title gives the
to the courtroom door.
Commission is time in which to find that there has been a violation
and time in which to seek conciliation. [A finding of reasonable
cause] is not a condition precedent to the action of taking a defendant
to court. A complainant has an absolute right to go into court, and
this provision does not affect that right at all.
When Congress subsequently amended Title VII in 1972, according
to the Senate Committee Report, the "primary concern should be to
protect the aggrieved person's option to seek a prompt judicial]
remedy" and "the individual shall have an opportunity to seek his
own [judicial] remedy, even though he may have originally submitted

119. Id. at 14188.
120. See id. at 14186.
121. Id. at 14188.

Senator Humphrey had earlier characterized the transfer of authority to

bring suit from the EEOC to the aggrieved individual as "the most significant change" in Title Vll
to occur in the Senate. See id. at 12722. A sentiment here echoed by Senator Saltonstall. See id. at

14188.
122. Id. at 14191.
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his charge. to the Commission."l1 2 3 Further, the section-by-section
analysis of the final version of the 1972 Amendments, prepared by
Senators Javits and Williams, stated: "as the individual's rights to
redress are paramount under the provisions of Title VII it is necessary
that all avenues be left open for quick and effective relief." 24 This
language is broad and permissive as to aggrieved individuals' right to
seek judicial recourse.
In total, this legislative history supports the conclusion that Title
VII's enforcement provisions permit aggrieved individuals to either seek
EEOC assistance by filing an EEOC charge, or to directly seek judicial
recourse by filing a judicial complaint.
3. Congress has not Impliedly Endorsed the Conventional Judicial
Interpretation of TitleVII's Remedial Scheme
From a textualist perspective, the idea that Congress can endorse a
particular judicial interpretation of an earlier Congress's enactment "is
based, to begin with, on the patently false premise that the correctness
of statutory construction is to be measured by what the current
Congress desires, rather than by what the law as enacted meant." 2 5
When interpreting the meaning of earlier enactments, a textualist is
therefore not persuaded by subsequent Congressional inaction or silence
regarding a particular statutory provision.1 2 6 Title VII's enforcement
provisions have changed very little over time, and the manner in which
they have changed does not alter their meaning.1 27 Textualism
123. S. REP. NO. 92-415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., at, 23-24 (1971).
124. 118 CONG. REC. 7168 (1972). However, a subsequent Congress's statements
interpreting an earlier Congress's enactment is of limited value. See infra Part III.B.3.

125. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara Cnty., Cal., 480 U.S. 616, 671 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Barnhart, 534 U.S. at 462.
126. See Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep't of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 121 (2007) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) ("The only fair inference from Congress's silence is that Congress had nothing
further to say, its statutory text doing all of the talking."); United States v. Craft, 535 U.S.
274, 287 (2002) ("[C]ongressional inaction lacks persuasive significance because several equally
tenable inferences may be drawn from such inaction . . . ."); Cent. Bank of Denver v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 186 (1994) ("It is 'impossible to assert with any
degree of assurance that congressional failure to act represents' affirmative congressional
approval of the [courts'] statutory interpretation. . . .'); Johnson, 480 U.S. at 671-72 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("'The complicated check on legislation' . . . erected by our Constitution creates
an inertia that makes it impossible to assert with any degree of assurance that congressional
failure to act represents (1) approval of the status quo, as opposed to (2) inability to agree upon
how to alter the status quo, (3) unawareness of the status quo, (4) indifference to the status quo,
or even (5) political cowardice.").
127. See supra Part II.A-B.
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therefore eschews conjectural speculation regarding the meaning of
Congressional failure to alter the text of Title VII.
Even if that were not the case, the conventional judicial
understanding of Title VII's enforcement provisions may not be quite
as entrenched as it first appears. 12 8 Until the mid-1970s, courts rejected
most procedural defenses to Title VII.129 Jurisprudence has also often
interpreted the language of the EEOC enforcement provisions,
without addressing the meaning of the judicial enforcement
provisions. 130 For example, in Nat'1 R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan,
Justice Thomas interpreted the text of the EEOC enforcement
provisions,13 but did not interpret the text of the judicial enforcement
provisions.1 32 In contrast, cases that have squarely considered the
textual meaning of the judicial enforcement provisions appear less
certain about Title VII's enforcement scheme. 13 3 Any ambiguity in

128. See infra Part III.B.3.
129.

Federal courts "have been extremely reluctant to allow procedural technicalities to bar

claims brought under [Title VII]." Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 460-61 (5th Cir.
1970) (holding that an aggrieved individual can amend an EEOC charge, and that a subsequent
judicial complaint was limited to the scope of EEOC investigation that could reasonably be
expected to grow out of that EEOC charge). "It would be unrealistic to require an employee whose

rights are threatened with irreparable harm to exhaust his remedies before the EEOC prior to
seeking injunctive relief from the Court." Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 272 F. Supp. 332, 338
(S.D. Ind. 1967) (holding that employees who had not filed EEOC charges could join a class action
for injunctive relief with a plaintiff who had received notice of a failure to conciliate); see BARBARA
T. LINDEMANN, PAUL GROSSMAN & C. GEOFFREY WEIRICH, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW

27-3 to 27-4 (Bloomberg BNA, 5th ed. 2012). Initially, most procedural defenses were rejected,
and courts were willing to excuse non-compliance with procedural hurdles. The 1972 amendments
seemed to preserve this approach. Yet, judicial attitudes toward procedural defenses shifted in the

mid-1970s.
130. See Pinkard v. Pullman-Standard, a Div. of Pullman, Inc., 678 F.2d 1211, 1215 (5th Cir.
1982) (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2012)); Cunningham v. Litton Indus., 413 F.2d 887,
889-90 (9th Cir. 1969) (interpreting Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706(d)-(e), 78
Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d)-(f)(1))); Blue Bell Boots, Inc. v. EEOC,
418 F.2d 355, 356-57 (6th Cir. 1969) (interpreting Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(d) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d))); Georgia Power Co. v. EEOC, 412 F.2d 462, 467 (5th Cir.
1969) (interpreting Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(d) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(d))); Stebbins v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 382 F.2d 267, 267-68 (4th Cir. 1967) (interpreting
Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(e) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1))).
131. See Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 104-05 (2002).
132. See id. at 119 (mentioning 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) only in passing and neglecting to
mention 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3)).
133. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 503-06 (2006) (illustrating that the Court
examining the broad language of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), determined that it was intended to
avoid the amount-in-controversy limitation that then-existed under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and
unanimously held that Title VII's employee-numerosity requirement does not limit federal subject
matter jurisdiction); Eatmon v. Bristol Steel & Iron Works, Inc., 769 F.2d 1503, 1511-12 (11th Cir.
1985) (holding that pursuant to the broad grant of federal jurisdiction, a civil action regarding
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judicial precedent signifies corresponding ambiguity in the meaning, if
any, of Congressional inaction.
4. In Reality, the Administrative Exhaustion Requirement
Serves No Purpose
Treating the EEOC charge-filing period as a statute of limitations
currently serves no purpose other than to act as an arbitrary procedural
barrier to judicial recourse.
Filing an EEOC charge does not necessarily provide prompt notice
to an employer, because "most lower courts have held that private
actions are not blocked by the EEOC's failure to serve notice of the
134 Directly filing a civil action, on
charge on the respondents . .
the other hand, would serve the aim of providing timely notice to an
employer of alleged Title VII violations.1 35
Filing an EEOC charge rarely results in reconciliation. 136

Courts

have held that the EEOC's failure to attempt conciliation does not bar
judicial suit.1 3 7 An aggrieved individual may choose to file a judicial
complaint immediately after filing an EEOC charge.138 EEOC case
backlogs and delays also make conciliation unlikely.1 3 9 Filing an EEOC

breach of a settlement agreement may be brought directly without first filing an EEOC charge);
EEOC v. Henry Beck Co., 729 F.2d 301, 303 n.7, 305-06 (4th Cir. 1984) ("[The jurisdictional
provision] mentions no prerequisite in broadly providing for federal district court jurisdiction over

'actions brought under' Title VII[,]" holding that the EEOC prerequisites did not apply to a civil
action for preliminary relief); supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
134. SAMUEL ESTREICHER & MICHAEL C. HARPER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW 595 (4th ed. 2012); see also Schlueter v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 132 F.3d

455, 458-59 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that the EEOC's failure to process an EEOC charge equitably
tolled the limitations period for filing judicial suit).
135. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2012).
136.

See ESTREICHER & HARPER, supra note 134, at 595.

137.

See Walker v. UPS, Inc., 240 F.3d 1268, 1271-73 (10th Cir. 2001) (reviewing case law to

that effect, and determining that attempted conciliation is not required); see also Rosen v. Pub. Serv.

Elec. & Gas Co., 409 F.2d 775, 778 n.11 (3d Cir. 1969) ("In view of recent decisions in a number of
circuits .. . actual efforts at conciliation by the EEOC were not a prerequisite to the filing of a civil

action under Title VII...."); Miller v. Int'l Paper Co., 408 F.2d 283, 290 (5th Cir. 1969)
("[Aggrieved individuals are] not responsible for the acts or omissions of the Commission.... [and]
should not be denied judicial relief because of circumstances over which they have no control.");

Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F.2d 357, 361 (7th Cir. 1968) ("[A] complainant should not
be made to suffer innocently for administrative delays for which he is not responsible.").
138. See Pinkard v. Pullman-Standard, a Div. of Pullman, Inc., 678 F.2d 1211, 1219 (5th Cir.
1982) (holding that an aggrieved individual may file a lawsuit immediately after filing an EEOC
charge, and then later submit EEOC notice that conciliation is obviated due to the pending lawsuit).
139. ARTHUR B. SMITH, JR., CHARLES B. CRAVER & RONALD TURNER, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 919 (7th ed. 2011) ("Large and unmanageable

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol32/iss2/4

24

Swanson: A Textualist Approach to Title VII: Aggrieved Individuals May Byp
A TEXTUALISTAPPROACH TO TITLE VII

2015]

369

charge also serves no screening function. 14 0 Filing an EEOC charge is
not a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing a civil suit in court.' 4 1 Filing
an EEOC charge is not even a prerequisite to filing civil suit in
court if the EEOC or another aggrieved individual happens to have
already filed an applicable EEOC charge 42 or if the individual seeks
an injunctive remedy.143 In the Eleventh Circuit, an employee may bring

-case backlogs at the EEOC led not only to criticism of the conciliation process as a viable
mechanism for resolving civil rights disputes but to pressure on the EEOC to release
charging parties from the lengthy delays of administrative process so that they could pursue

claims without further EEOC involvement. This resulted in an EEOC procedural regulation
which permits charging parties to . . . [sue] even though conciliation efforts have not yet

commenced or been completed."). Reconciliation may in fact be deterred by the EEOC chargefiling deadline, because it is not tolled during private reconciliation efforts. See Int'l Union of

Electronical, Radio & Mach. Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229, 236, 244 (1976)
(holding that the EEOC filing period is not tolled during a collective bargaining grievance
procedure).

140. Under Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012)), a claimant may bring suit even if the EEOC has found no
evidence of employment discrimination, although the EEOC must find "reasonable cause" before
the EEOC may bring suit. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798-99
(1973).

The EEOC also issues a right-to-sue letter whenever a charging party requests it. See 29

C.F.R. § 1601.28(b)(1) (2014). Finally, the scope of an EEOC charge only loosely determines the
potential scope of a subsequent private suit. "Because persons filing charges with the EEOC
typically lack legal training, those charges must be interpreted with the utmost liberality in order not

to frustrate the remedial purposes of Title VII." Cobb v. Stringer, 850 F.2d 356, 359-60 (8th Cir.
1988) (citing EEOC v. Michael Constr. Co., 706 F.2d 244, 248 (8th Cir. 1983)) (concluding that
material issues of fact existed as to whether an EEOC charge was timely-filed). A Title VII claim
"may encompass any kind of discrimination like or related to allegations contained in a charge and

growing out of such allegation during the pendency of the case before the [EEOC]." Sanchez v.
Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 466-67 (5th Cir. 1970) (quoting King v. Georgia Power Co.,
295 F. Supp. 943, 947 (N.D. Ga. 1968)) (permitting the amendment of EEOC charge); see also
Jones v. Calvert Group Ltd., 551 F.3d 297, 304 (4th Cir. 2009) (illustrating that a Title VII claimant
who alleges discriminatory retaliation against filing an EEOC charge need not file a second EEOC
charge encompassing the retaliation).
141. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982) (holding that filing a
timely EEOC charge is not a jurisdictional prerequisite, and that an employer who fails to plead that
an EEOC charge was untimely waives its right to object).
142. Under the "single-filing" or "piggy-backing" rule, a plaintiff who fails to file a
timely EEOC charge and who cannot justify equitable tolling can pursue a claim by opting
into a Title VII class action. See Howlett v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 49 F.3d 189, 194 (6th Cir.
1995); see also Grayson v. KMart Corp., 79 F.3d 1086, 1101 (1lth Cir. 1996); Mooney v.
Aramco Serv. Co., 54 F.3d 1207, 1223 (5th Cir. 1995). The single-filing rule also permits
such a claimant to join an action filed by a similarly-situated person whose timely charge gave
notice of the collective nature of the charge. See Brooks v. Dist. Hosp.

Partners, L.P., 606

F.3d 800, 807-08 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (piggy-backing permitted where charge alleged screening test
discriminated against African Americans); see also Calloway v. Partners Nat'l Health Plans,
986 F.2d 446 (11th Cir. 1993).
143. See Wagner v. Taylor, 836 F.2d 566, 571 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (court may enjoin retaliation
during pendency of EEOC proceedings); Duke v. Langdon, 695 F.2d 1136, 1137 (9th Cir. 1983)
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civil suit prior to filing an EEOC charge so long as the employee
subsequently files an EEOC charge and amends the complaint within
ninety days of receiving notice from the EEOC of failure to
conciliate. 144 Finally, the EEOC does not have superior fact-finding
abilities to courts, nor is judicial discovery limited by the EEOC's
investigations.14 5
C. Despite Considerationsof Stare Decisis, SeparationofPowers
Requires the Judiciary to Respect the Law as Enacted by Congress
When courts have misinterpreted a legislative act, the judiciary
may choose not to correct that misinterpretation due to the doctrine of
stare decisis, which is a "principle of policy" against overruling
precedent.1 4 6 Stare decisis "promotes the evenhanded, predictable,
and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on
judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity
of the judicial process." 4 7 The textualist interpretive approach may
entirely discount the doctrine of stare decisis, because separation of
powers prohibits judicial usurpation of Congressional authority.1 4 8
(the court may grant preliminary injunction prior to completion of EEOC proceedings); Holt v.
Continental Group, Inc., 708 F.2d 87, 89-90 (2d Cir. 1983) (the court may consider request for
reinstatement before initiation or conclusion of EEOC proceedings); Berg v. Richmond Unified
Sch. Dist., 528 F.2d 1208, 1211-12 (9th Cir. 1975) (the court may grant an injunction before
administrative exhaustion) (per curiam), vacated on othergrounds, 434 U.S. 158 (1977).
144. See Cross v. Ala., State Dep't of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 49 F.3d 1490,
1504 (11th Cir. 1995).
145. "[E]xhaustion rules are often applied in deference to the superior fact-finding ability of
the relevant administrative agency." Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of the State of Fla., 457 U.S. 496,
506-07 (1982) (citing CON. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 216, 322, 476, 692 (1871)) (examining
the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13, the precursor to Section
1983, the court concluded that the bill enabled plaintiffs to choose from dual or concurrent
forums, and that exhaustion of administrative remedies should not be judicially imposed).
146. See Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940).
147. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991); see also United States, 514 U.S.
695, 720 (1995) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The principle of stare decisis is designed to
promote stability and certainty in the law."); Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986)
(illustrating that stare decisis ensures that "the law will not merely change erratically" and
"permits society to presume that bedrock principles are founded in the law rather than in the
proclivities of individuals"); Alexander Hamilton, THE FEDERALIST, No. 78, 430 (H. Lodge eds.,
1888) (Staredecisis ensures that the jurisprudential system is not based on "arbitrary discretion").
148. "Of the Court's current members, Justices Scalia and Thomas seem to have the most faith
in the determinacy of the legal texts that come before the Court. It should come as no surprise that
they also seem the most willing to overrule the Court's past decisions." Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis
and Demonstrably ErroneousPrecedents, 87 VA. L. REV. 1, 50-51 (2001). According to Justice
Scalia, Justice Thomas "doesn't believe in stare decisis, period." Douglas T. Kendall, A Big
Question About Clarence Thomas, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 14, 2004, at A31; Lincoln Caplan,
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Textualists are often willing to overrule even long-established
judicial precedent in favor of an interpretation that better reflects the
text, as enacted by Congress. 14 9 For example, Justices Scalia and
Thomas recently advocated overturning almost thirty-five years of
50 and Justice Thomas expressed willingness to reexamine
precedent,o
precedent that had not been seriously challenged for over 200 years.' 5
The textualist approach therefore requires adherence to the text of Title
VII, despite half a century of precedent to the contrary. The judiciary
has the "obligation" to disregard precedent that is contrary to the law,
"even when doing so will upset settled expectations, reduce judicial
economy, or result in differential treatment for similarly-situated
litigants."l5 2
Even under a non-textualist approach to statutory interpretation,
refusal to permit aggrieved individuals under Title VII to directly seek
judicial recourse due to the doctrine of stare decisis would be
misplaced. Stare decisis is not a "mechanical formula of adherence
to the latest decision," 53 an "inexorable command," 54 or "an end in
After weighing the advantages and disadvantages, the Court
itself."'
may overrule precedent to ensure that the law does "not merely change
erratically, but .. . [instead] develop[s] in a principled and intelligible
fashion." 56 "[W]hen governing decisions are unworkable or badly
reasoned," the Supreme Court has "'never felt constrained to follow
precedent,"" 5 ' particularly in cases involving procedural rules.158

Clarence Thomas's Brand of Judicial Logic, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2011, at SRI0. Although "the
Court must demand a good reason for abandoning prior precedent," it is "ample reason that the
precedent was badly reasoned and produces erroneous. . . results." Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332,
353 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (expressing the opinion that the Court should overrule New York
v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981)).
149. See generally Steven G. Calabresi, Text vs. Precedent in Constitutional Law, 31
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 947, 951-55 (2008) (the Supreme Court overruled seventy years of long
standing precedent on textualist principles in ten cases).
150. Justices Scalia and Thomas advocated overruling Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966); see Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444-65 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
151. E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 539 (1998) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("I would be
willing to reconsider Calder [v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798)] and its progeny to determine
whether a retroactive civil law that passes muster under our current Takings Clause jurisprudence is
nonetheless unconstitutional under the Ex Post Facto Clause.").
152. See Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARv. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 23, 26-28 (1994).
153. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940).
154. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003).
155. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 378 (2010).
156. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986).
157. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (quoting Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S.
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As this Article has demonstrated, to the extent that governing
decisions consider the procedural EEOC charge-filing requirement to
be a judicial requirement, those decisions are badly reasoned.
IV. CONCLUSION: COURTS SHOULD PERMIT VICTIMS OF EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION TO BYPASS THE EEOC

This Article demonstrates that there is a discrepancy between the
unambiguous text of Title VII's enforcement provisions and current
judicial doctrine: Title VII does not require aggrieved individuals to file
an EEOC charge prior to bringing a civil action.159 Non-textualist
interpretive tools, including Title VII's statutory scheme and legislative
history, further support the conclusion that Congress did not intend the
EEOC charge deadline to serve as a judicial statute of limitations.16 0
Even giving due consideration to the doctrine of stare decisis, courts
should permit aggrieved individuals to bypass the EEOC.16 1

649, 665
158.
159.
160.
161.

(1944)).
Id. at 828.
See supra Part II.
See supra Parts II.B.2, IlI.B.
See supra Part III.C.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol32/iss2/4

28

